President Eisenhower=s Foreign Policy and the Ugly American

Presented at the 20th International Congress of Historical Sciences

Sydney Australia,  2-9 July, 2005

By Keith P. Dyrud

 

Abstract:

While President Eisenhower followed an anti‑communist foreign policy in the 1950s, this presentation will suggest that he opposed Athird world@ nationalism and overthrew several democratic governments in order to facilitate ongoing economic control of Athird world@ resources.  His efforts to link the nationalist movements with communism was a foil to make his third world policy acceptable to the American people.

  Even Eisenhower=s memoirs connect the Guatemalan and Iranian democracies with communism in such a convoluted way that they seem to be rationalizations rather than the real reasons for replacing those governments with  a military dictatorship and an authoritarian monarchy, respectively.

*          *          *

 

The Ugly American, a book by William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, was published as a novel in 1958, but its contents were a serious indictment of American foreign policy.  When first published, the book was a Arunaway national best-seller@ drawing a Adevastating picture of how the United States was losing the struggle with Communism in Asia.@[1]  While the book may have been a Arunaway best-seller,@ it did not change American foreign policy.

Dwight D. Eisenhower was in his second term as president of the United States so it was his foreign policy that Lederer and Burdick critically analyzed.  They agreed with Eisenhower=s stated objectives in America=s foreign policy, especially the need to stop the expansion of Communism, but they argued that the policy as implemented did not achieve that objective. 

While Lederer and Burdick generally argued that economic policy was the primary arena for competition, they also noted that in Viet Nam, the United States had supported the French in their colonial war against the Communists.  Lederer and Burdick described: AThe battles which led to Dien Bien Phu were classic examples of the Mao pattern.  And yet our military missions advised, and the French went down to defeat, without having studied Mao=s writings.@[2]

In economic policy, Lederer and Burdick argued that:

 


   Most American technicians abroad are involved in the planning and execution of Abig@ projects: dams, highways, irrigation systems.  The result is that we often develop huge technical complexes which someday may pay dividends but which at this moment in Asian development are neither needed nor wanted except by a few local politicians who see such projects as a means to power and wealth.  Technicians who want to work on smaller and more manageable projects are not encouraged.  The authors of this book gathered statements from native economists of what projects were Amost urgently needed@ in various Asian countries.  These included improvement of chicken and pig breeding, small pumps which did not need expensive replacement parts, knowledge on commercial fishing, canning of food, improvement of seeds, small village-size papermaking plants (illiteracy in many countries is perpetrated by the fact that no one can afford paper), sanitary use of night-soil, and the development of small industries.  These are the projects which would not only make friends, while costing little, but are also prerequisite to industrialization and economic independence for Asia.  They must be realized before Communism can lose its appeal.  We pay for huge highways through jungles in Asian lands where there is no transport except bicycle and foot.  We finance dams where the greatest immediate need is a portable pump.  We provide many millions of dollars= worth of military equipment which wins no wars and raises no standard of living.[3]

 

The authors of The Ugly American went onto argue that AWe do not need the horde of 1,500,000 AmericansBmostly amateursBwho are now working for the United States overseas.  What we need is a small force of well-trained, well-chosen, hard-working, and dedicated professionals.@[4]

Lederer and Burdick missed several important points in their analysis: The French war in Viet Nam was a war by the French to hold on to a colony in which they were fighting against a nationalist independence movement which was incidently Communist. And most of the 1.5 million Americans working overseas were working for private companies whose objective was to make profits for the American shareholders of those companies, not to benefit the poor people in the developing countries.  Lederer and Burdick also did not seem to realize that the Abig projects: dams, highways, irrigation systems,@ paid for by American foreign aid, were meant to build the infrastructure necessary for those American companies to do business profitably.  It was not the concern of American policy makers that these projects did not help the poor in those countries.

 

                                  Historians= Evaluations of Eisenhower=s Foreign Policy

 

In the 1960s the first historians of President Eisenhower=s administration followed the common view that Eisenhower was not a Ahands on@ administrator, but rather left policy and the implementation of that policy to his advisors.  Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, designed and implemented American foreign policy.  Revisionists have convincingly changed the view that Eisenhower was detached from policy making.[5]   Perhaps the best description of the relationship between the President and his Secretary of State is that of the relationship between client and his attorney,  Aa client who has firm overall purposes and an attorney who is expected to help him devise ways to accomplish those purposes and to argue his case.@[6]

Much of the Eisenhower administration=s stated rationale for its foreign policy was anti-communism.  Some scholars have suggested that this statement of policy was necessary in order to maintain the support of the right wing in Congress.[7]  Many others suggest that Eisenhower misunderstood developing countries= national liberation movements, identifying them as Communist and using the CIA to oppose or crush them.  For example, Robert J. McMahon, a former State Department historian observed:

 


The Eisenhower administration insisted on viewing the Third World through the invariably distorting lens of a Cold War geopolitical strategy that saw the Kremlin as a principal instigator of global unrest.  As a result, it often wound up simplifying complicated local and regional developments. Confusing nationalism with communism, aligning the United States with inherently unstable and unrepresentative regimes, and wedding American interests to the status quo in areas undergoing fundamental social, political, and economic upheaval.  Rather than promoting long-term stability in the Third World, the foreign policy of the Eisenhower administration contributed to its instability, thus undermining a basic American policy goal.  In this critical area, then, the Eisenhower record appears one of persistent failure.[8]

 

Robert W. Stookey, in America and the Arab States, concluded that, in the Arab world, the Eisenhower Administration Anever arrived at a clear distinction between communism and revolutionary Arab nationalism.@[9]

The United States invaded Lebanon in 1958.  Robert Divine, generally a sympathetic Eisenhower specialist, concluded that Eisenhower had Aa clear sense of the strategic value of Persian Gulf oil and acted boldly to protect that vital national interest.@[10]  But as McMahon noted:  Aeven Divine concedes that the danger of communist subversion in Lebanon, which served as a pretext for the invasion, was in fact nonexistent.@[11]

In oil rich Venezuela, the United States supported a particularly brutal dictator, Perez Jimenez.  He was deposed in January 1958 creating a particularly anti-American backlash among the population.  Eisenhower=s Vice President, Richard Nixon visited Venezuela in May of that year and was almost killed by an angry mob.[12]  But as McMahon noted, AThe Eisenhower administration continually blocked any Venezuelan efforts to gain more control over their only important resource: oil.  And when the President announced price cuts and import quotas on Venzuelan petroleum in 1959, Venzuelan leaders responded by founding the Organization of Petroleum ExportingCountries (OPEC), a cartel that would raise fundamental problems for the United States in succeeding years.@[13]

Eisenhower also identified the African independence movements as Communist.  When Patrice Lumumba led the successful independence movement in the Belgian Congo, the Eisenhower administration considered him to be a Communist threat to the whole of central Africa.  The administration actually ordered the CIA to assassinate him.  The attempts were not successful, and as Robert J. McMahon summarized historian Stephen R. Weissman=s conclusion: AThe Eisenhower administration . . .simply failed to understand the political force of nationalism represented by Lumumba and instead mistakenly based its policy on international communist conspiracies that were completely illusory.@[14]

 

President Eisenhower Speaks for Himself

 

On leaving the office of President in 1961, Eisenhower wrote his memoirs of his two terms as President of the United States, entitled The White House Years.  The first volume, covering his first term, is sub-titled, Mandate for Change.[15]  These memoirs are quite honest and with only slight interpretation, are actually a serious indictment of his foreign policy, especially in the Eisenhower Administration=s treatment of three countries in three areas of the globe: Iran in 1953-4, Viet Nam in 1954-5, and Guatemala in 1954.

 

Iran

 


The British government owned 52 percent of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company which controlled the Iranian oil supply.  In 1952, the Iranian government, headed by Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh nationalized Iranian oil.  In retaliation, the British shut down the Abadan refinery and Aclamped a boycott on all Iranian oil.@[16] 

   AThe leader of this drive was Iran=s Premier, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, a semi-invalid who often clad in pajamas in public, carried on a fanatical campaign, with tears and fainting fits and street mobs of followers, to throw the British out of Iran, come what might.@[17]

That sentence should have read: The leader of this drive was Iran=s Premier, Dr. Mohammed Mossadegh, who while not in vigorous health, was an ardent nationalist dressed in Iran=s traditional garb using emotive language in his campaign to appeal to the people=s sense of national pride and desire for Iranian resources to be controlled by Iranians.  This objective could not be achieved while Britain controlled Iranian oil.

 

   [Eisenhower wrote:] In January of 1953 the Iranian parliament extended Mossadegh=s dictatorial powers for another year.  The following month, Mossadegh, pushing his strength, denounced the Shah, the constitutional monarch, for intrigues with Aforeign interests.=  Pressed by Mossadegh, the Shah on February 28 announced he would abdicate Afor reasons of health.@  This brought on serious riots; the Shah=s supporters, along with rival supporters of Mossadegh, choked the streets.  As a result, in a direct challenge to Mossadegh, the Shah within hours canceled his plan of abdication.[18]

 

Properly interpreted, this passage should be understood as: The Iranian parliament extended Mossadegh=s emergency powers for another year.  The Shah was exceeding his role as a constitutional monarch by negotiating with the British to get the Anglo-Persian Oil Company back in business again.  When challenged by Mossadegh, the Shah resigned in despair but the United States, through the CIA, convinced him to cancel his abdication and let the CIA work with the Iranian army to overthrow the democratically elected government.

 

   A crisis was approaching.  Three months earlier Mossadegh had tried to get the parliament to pass legislation making him Commander-in Chief of the Iranian Army, replacing the Shah in this position.  The parliament refused.  On July 19, therefore, Mossadegh called for the dissolution of the Majlis, the second house of the Iranian parliament, and for a plebiscite to be held August 2.  Less than a week after this announcement, reports came in that Mossadegh was moving closer and closer to the Communists.[19]

 


This should read: With the Shah cooperating with the British to reverse the government=s policy of nationalization, Mossadegh, fearing British military intervention, asked parliament for the power as Commander in Chief of the Army.  The second house of the parliament refused to grant that permission.  Since the post-war government of Iran was patterned after the British, the second house of parliament was appointed, not elected.  Since Mossadegh knew his government=s nationalization policy was very popular with the Iranian people, he dissolved the second house of parliament and called for a plebiscite on his policy.  Mossadegh knew that any nationalization policy would have the support of the Communists.

AIn the plebiscite three days later Mossadegh got 99.4 per cent of the votes.  Iran=s downhill course toward Communist-supported dictatorship was picking up momentum.@[20]

Eisenhower should have written:  The popular support for Mossadegh=s policy was so overwhelming that it was clear he did not need the support of the Communists nor did he ask for their support.  Such an appeal to the popular will must certainly be called democratic leadership.

AMossadegh, the Shah thought, believed that he could form an alliance with the Tudeh Party and then outwit it: but in doing so, the Shah recognized, Dr. Mossadegh would become to Iran what the ill-fated Dr. Benes had been in CzechoslovakiaBa leader whom the Communists, having gained power, would eventually destroy.@[21]

That should have read: The Shah had committed his future to the CIA=s ability to use the military to overthrow Mossadegh knowing full-well that Mossadegh neither needed nor requested the support of the Tudeh [Communist] party.  Mossadegh certainly would not have become another Benes.

 

   But we did not stop trying to retrieve the situation.  I conferred daily with officials of the State and Defense departments and the Central Intelligence Agency and saw reports from our representatives on the spot who were working actively with the Shah=s supporters.

   Then suddenly and dramatically, the opposition to Mossadegh and the CommunistsBby those loyal to the ShahBbegan to work.  The Iranian Army turned against officers whom Mossadegh had installed. . . .  The next day Mossadegh, in pajamas, surrendered.[22]

 

It should read: Our State Department, the military, and the Central Intelligence Agency were working actively with the Shah=s supporters to overthrow Mossadegh.   Then suddenly and dramatically, the covert operations of the CIA began to be effective.  Selected army officers took control of the Iranian army and arrested Mossadegh, who surrendered in his traditional Iranian dress.

June 29, 1953, Eisenhower wrote: AI refused, however, to pour more American money into a country in turmoil in order to bail Mossadegh out of troubles rooted in his refusal to work out an agreement with the British.@[23]  Less than three months later with the Shah ruling as a dictator, Eisenhower wrote:  AI announced on September 5 an additional $45 million for emergency economic assistance.  In all, American aid to Iran that fiscal year came to nearly $85 million.@[24]

 

In 1954 the country held new elections.  And in August of that year the Iranian government reached an agreement with an international consortium to buy Iran=s oil.

   Under a special ruling by the Department of Justice, based on the national-security needs of the United States, American oil companies participated in this consortium without fear of prosecution under antitrust laws.[25]

 


A more informative wording would have read: In 1954 the country held controlled elections.  And in August of that year the Iranian government reached an agreement with an international consortium to buy Iran=s oil.

It would have been a violation of the Clayton and Sherman anti-trust laws for American oil companies to join together in such a consortium, so the Justice Department declared the situation to be a matter of Anational-security@ Thus the laws could be violated without fear of prosecution.

Prior to 1950, Great Britain controlled Iranian oil.  After the democratic and nationalistic government of Mossadegh was overthrown by the American CIA, an international consortium controlled by American oil companies, controlled Iranian oil.  Eisenhower=s arguments that equated nationalism with communism, were so obviously unfounded that it is easy to conclude that the basic objective of American policy towards Iran was to gain American control of Iranian oil.  That policy was successful.

 

Viet Nam

 

In his Mandate for Change, President Eisenhower provided very little policy information about American involvement in Viet Nam, perhaps because American involvement there was far from over.  He did, however, provide a historical sketch describing events leading to American military involvement there. 

In May 1954 the French were defeated in the battle of Dien Bien Phu.  By then the French were anxious to end their military involvement and seek a political settlement.  This settlement took place at an international conference in Geneva in July of that year.  Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, were not enthusiastic about that venue and agenda so Bedell Smith represented the United States at the conference.  The conference agreement called for elections to be held in Viet Nam in 1956.  The purpose of those elections was to select the leader of a reunited North and South Viet Nam which had been temporarily divided by the cease fire. 

Eisenhower wrote: 

 

The agreement did contain features, I admitted, that we did not like, but a great deal would depend on how these features worked out in practice. AThe United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the conference declaration,@ I said, Abut . . . in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in Article II of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement.  We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed by us as a matter of grave concern.@[26]

 


The United States, however, did not honor that agreement.  The United States did Ause force to disturb the settlement,@ thus starting AAmerica=s longest war.@  Indirectly, Eisenhower explained why the United States effectively took over the French military role.  He wrote:  AI have never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indochinese affairs who did not agree that had elections been held as of the time of the fighting, possibly 80 per cent of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai.@[27]  Actually Eisenhower never admitted to taking over the French military role.  AHad the circumstances lent themselves to a logical use of military force, the task of explaining to the American public the necessity for sacrifice would have been an acceptable one.  But the losses would have been heavy, and because there never arose a situation justifying intervention, speculation as to Amight have beens@ isBas alwaysBscarcely more than an exercise in futility.[28]  While Eisenhower may not have admitted to committing the United States militarily to replace the French, he did send thousands of Amilitary advisors@ to South Viet Nam and provided the South Vietnamese army with virtually all its equipment. 

Eisenhower also claimed to be Aanticolonial.@ He wrote: AThe strongest reason of all for the United States refusal to respond by itself to French pleas was our tradition of anticolonialism. . . .[T]he standing of the United States as the most powerful of the anticolonial powers is an asset of incalculable value to the Free World.@[29] 

Eisenhower seemed to be blinded to his own argument concerning Aanticolonialism.@  For a former colony to be anti-colonial means that country is nationalistic, that is, that former colony is determined to control its own political and economic destinyBa position which is often equated with Afreedom.@  Eisenhower never admitted that.  In virtually every former colony in the world which developed a nationalistic movement, Eisenhower declared that movement to be ACommunist@ and he set about destroying it.  In Viet Nam, he was willing to violate the will of A80 per cent of the population.@

 

Guatemala

 

In 1944 the military dictator of Guatemala, General Jorge Ubico, was overthrown and a more popularly supported leadership led by Juan Jose Arevalo took its place.  In 1950 Arevalo did not run for reelection because the constitution limited the president=s term to six years.   Eisenhower described that election:

 

In 1950 a military officer, Jacobo Arbenz Guzman, came to power and by his actions soon created the strong suspicion that he was merely a puppet manipulated by Communists.

   The American republics wanted no Communist regime within their midst.  They recognized that subversion by Communism was only another form of aggression, even more evil than that achieved by naked military force.[30]

 

Eisenhower could have said: In 1950 Jacobo Arbenz Guzman was constitutionally elected president of Guatemala by an overwhelming majority.  He was not a Communist or a member of the Communist party but some of the things he did to improve the lot of the poor and unemployed are the kind of things that Communists might do.  I think that Communism is even worse than military dictatorships, and the other American republics should think the same as I do.  


However, Eisenhower went on to admit that Arbenz may not have been motivated by the Communists.  He wrote:  [In countries] Awhere some governments were being ruled by dictatorial means, where resentments against the United States were sometimes nurtured by groups other than Communist cells, it was difficult to differentiate positively between Communist influence and uncontrolled and politically rebellious groups.@[31]  Eisenhower was probably hinting his awareness that Arbenz was not a Communist but that he was a leader of an Auncontrolled and politically rebellious group.@

Eisenhower continued:

 

For example, on February 24, 1953, the Arbenz government announced its intention, under an agrarian reform law, to seize about 225,000 acres of unused United Fruit Company land.  The company lost its appeal to the Guatemalan Supreme Court to prevent this discriminatory and unfair seizure.  (Of all lands expropriated, two thirds belonged to United Fruit.  In return the company was to receive the woefully inadequate compensation of $600,000 in long-term non-negotiable agrarian bonds.)

 

What Eisenhower did not say, was that several of his closest advisors had Aprior connections to United Fruit Company@ and they included Secretary of State John Foster Dulles and Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA.[32], and that United Fruit Company was trying to break a plantation workers union in Guatemala by closing down a significant portion of its plantations resulting in far fewer jobs than workers.  For the idle plantations, the Arbenz government paid the amount that United Fruit Company had declared as their value for tax assessment.[33]

By 1954, the Eisenhower administration had decided to act against the Arbenz government.  The United States Aquarantined@ Guatemala, determining that it would search all vessels suspected of carrying arms to Guatemala.   As Eisenhower noted: Asuch measures would require at least the tacit cooperation of our allies, principally Britain, to avoid placing an almost fatal strain on our relations.@[34]  But this decision ran into trouble with Great Britain as Anthony Eden replied: AThere is no general power of search on the high seas in peace time.@[35] But, when Anthony Eden suggested that he would make sure no British ships were carrying arms to Guatemala, Eisenhower wrote that Awe considered [that statement] adequate.@[36]  This suggested that Eisenhower considered that statement by Eden to be tacit acceptance of the American quarantine of Guatemala. 

Eisenhower historian Richard H. Immerman accepted President Eisenhower=s position that it was his anti-communist policy that determined actions in Guatemala and elsewhere in developing countries.  Immerman suggested that Eisenhower actually understood the nature of nationalist movements in developing countries writing that AEisenhower argued that the Western powers should make gradual concessions to satisfy the spirit of nationalism in developing nations, thereby assuring their continued support.@[37]  However, Immerman demonstrated that United Fruit Company was not so naive.  AThe United Fruit Company effectively used this overarching fear of Communist subversion in order to evoke government and popular sympathy for its plight.  Under the astute guidance of its prestigious public relations counsel, Edward Bernays, UFCO launched a massive publicity campaign.@[38]

The CIA helped organize a counter revolutionary army under the leadership of Carlos Castillo Armas and through a third country supplied that army with three bombers.  The bombers were used to bomb Guatemala City until June 22 when two of them were shot down.  Eisenhower then presided over an emergency meeting to determine if the bombers should be replaced.  Eisenhower wrote:

 


   A meeting was arranged that afternoon with [John] Foster Dulles, Allen Dulles [Head of the CIA], and Henry F. Holland, who had succeeded John Cabot as Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.  The point at issue was whether the United States should cooperate in replacing the bombers.  The country which had originally supplied this equipment to Castillo was willing now to supply him two P-51 fighter-bombers if the United States would agree to replace them.  The sense of our meeting was far from unanimous.  Henry, a sincere and dedicated public servant and a real expert in Latin American affairs, made no secret of his conviction that the United States should keep hands off, insisting that other Latin American republics would, if our action became known, interpret our shipment of planes as intervention in Guatemala=s internal affairs. Others, however, felt that our agreeing to replace the bombers was the only hope for Castillo Armas, who was obviously the only hope of restoring freedom to Guatemala.

   AWhat do you think Castillo=s chances would be,@ I asked Allen Dulles, Awithout the aircraft?@

   His answer was unequivocal: AAbout zero.@

   ASuppose we supply the aircraft.  What would the chances be then?@

   Again the CIA chief did not hesitate: AAbout 20 per cent.@

. . . We would replace the airplanes.[39]

 

Five days later Arbenz relinquished power and Colonel Castillo Armas eventually headed the new ruling junta, and the American owned United Fruit Company got its plantations back.

For some curious reason, Eisenhower reported the small talk between Allen Dulles, the head of the CIA and himself, as they left that meeting.  He quoted Allen Dulles as saying: A>Mr. President,@ he said, a grin on his face, >when I saw Henry walking into your office with three large law books under his arm, I knew he had lost his case already.=@[40] The reader can only conclude that President Eisenhower was recording his contempt for international law.

 

Concluding Observations

 

When President Eisenhower dealt with policy regarding developing nations anywhere in the world, he consistently intervened to overthrow nationalist governments or prevent nationalist movements from coming to power.  Where developing countries were governed by dictators, he was willing to allow those dictators to remain in power provided they would cooperate with American economic interests.  The case of Iran is especially interesting because the CIA=s overthrow of a popular nationalistic government led to the establishment of American economic dominance in a country that had previously been dominated by British economic interests.  In Guatemala, the overthrow of the popular nationalistic government simply revived the economic dominance the United States had enjoyed before the 1944 revolution.


Eisenhower did not respect democratic-nationalist governments even when they had demonstrated the popularity of their policies through plebiscites as was done in Iran.  The Arbenz government in Guatemala was obviously popular with policies that were supported by the poor workers who were a large majority of the people.  And in Viet Nam, he refused to allow elections to be held at all because he suspected Ho Chi Minh would have won 80 per cent of the vote.  Eisenhower used very strained reasoning to argue that these nationalist governments were Communist.  He generally had to resort to arguing that the Communists in those countries supported the nationalist policies.  It is also reasonable to conclude that Eisenhower=s foreign aid did not help the poor in the countries that received it.  That failure to help the poor while the Communists made a point of helping the poor was the strongest criticism of US foreign policy made by Lederer and Burdick in their book, The Ugly American.

It is difficult to believe that Eisenhower and his policy makers were so naive as to believe their charges that these governments were Communist.  Most likely those arguments were made to gain the support of the right wing Republicans and to persuade the American public to support the Eisenhower Administration=s foreign policy regarding developing countries.  Thus one can reasonably conclude that the Eisenhower Administration=s policy toward the developing countries was directed to support American companies in their efforts to maintain or gain economic control of those countries in the guise of following an anti-communist policy.  In that effort they were reasonably successful even to the extent that they wrested economic control of former colonies from the European colonial powers.  Iran provided a classic example of that shift as economic control passed from Britain to the United States.

 

Notes



[1].From the back cover of William J. Lederer and Eugene Burdick, The Ugly American: (W. W. Norton & Co.: New York, London, 1958/1999).

[2].Lederer and Burdick, p. 279

[3].Lederer and Burdick, p. 281-282.

[4].Lederer and Burdick, p. 284.

[5].See introductory chapters in: Gunter Bishof and Stephen E. Ambrose, Eds., Eisenhower: A Centenary Assessment (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1995).

[6].Fred I. Greenstein, AEisenhower as an Activist President: A look at New Evidence,@ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 94:4, p. 582.

[7].Rosemary Foot, AThe Eisenhower Administration=s Fear of Empowering the Chinese,@ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 111:3, p. 505.

[8].Robert J. McMahon, AEisenhower and Third World Nationalism: A Critique of the Revisionists,@ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 101:3 [1986], p.457.

[9].Cited in McMahon, p. 463.

[10].Cited in McMahon, p. 465.

[11].McMahon, p. 465.

 

[12].McMahon, pp. 468-9.

[13].McMahon, pp. 468-9. Citing Stephen G. Rabe, The Road to OPEC: United States Relations with Venezuela, 1919-1976.  (Auston: University of Texas Press, 1982).

[14].McMahon, p 470.  Citing Madeleine G. Kalb, The Congo Cables: The cold War in AfricaBfrom Eisenhower to Kennedy(New York: Macmillan, 1982); and Stephen R. Weissman, American Foreign Policy in the Congo, 1960-1964 (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1974).

[15].Dwight d. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Mandate for Change, 1953-1956 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1963).

[16].Eisenhower, pp. 159.160.

[17].Eisenhower, p. 159.

[18].Eisenhower, p. 161.

[19].Eisenhower, pp. 162-63.

[20].Eisenhower, p. 163.

[21].Eisenhower, p. 163.

[22].Eisenhower, p. 164.

[23].Eisenhower, p. 162

[24].Eisenhower, p. 165.

[25].Eisenhower, p. 166.

[26].Eisenhower, p. 371.

[27].Eisenhower, p. 372.

[28].Eisenhower, p. 373.

[29].Eisenhower, p. 373-4.

[30].Eisenhower, p. 421.

[31].Eisenhower, p. 421.

 

[32].Richard H. Immerman, AGuatemala as Cold War History,@ Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 95:4 (Winter, 1980-81), p. 638, note 29.

[33].Immerman, p. 636.

[34].Eisenhower, pp. 424-5.

[35].Eisenhower, p. 425, note 11.

[36].Eisenhower, p. 425.

[37].Immerman, p. 638.

[38].Immerman, p. 637.

[39].Eisenhower, pp. 425-6.

[40].Eisenhower, p. 426.